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International Health Law
MICHELE FORZLEY, HALE HAWBECKER, MARK
AND GEORGE

E. WOJCIK,

EDMUND

G.

HOWE, III,

M. KRAw*

This article on recent events in international health law is divided into four parts:
(1) informed consent standards for alternative medicine; (2) intersexuality; (3)HIV/AIDS;
and (4) other recent developments.
I. An International Informed Consent Standard
In the last thirty years or so, legal doctrine has changed worldwide with respect to the
concept of informed consent in medical malpractice cases. Health care is also changing.
Patients are self-referring to complementary and alternative health care practitioners, and
traditional health care practitioners are offering non-traditional health care services. Is there
an international concept of informed consent that fits this new brand of health care?
A greater recognition of patient autonomy, arguably resulting from the human rights
movement, has changed the lens through which informed consent is judged in a patientcentered approach. While this has shifted risk onto the patient, it has also generated a
greater burden on health care professionals to provide more information to patients before
undertaking medical procedures. Widespread use of treatments and procedures called alternative or complementary now raises the issue of the duty to disclose more of these
choices.
There are various theories regarding the duty to inform, including measuring the duty
from the physician's viewpoint, or from the patient's viewpoint. The traditional view in

*Michele Forzley authored Section I (An International Informed Consent Standard). Ms. Forzley is an
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most jurisdictions is that the duty is measured by professional medical standards., By contrast, almost half of the jurisdictions in the United States have recently taken a more modern
view that the duty to inform is measured by the patient's need for information material to
his decision whether to accept or reject the proposed treatment.' This modern view has
also been adopted by several foreign countries, as will be noted in this review.
The questions this review addresses are: does an international informed consent standard
exist and where do nations stand in relation to it?
A.

IN GENERAL

The concept of consent is customarily found in international law and conventions in the
area of human rights. A review of international materials indicates that consent before
treatment is a principle of customary international law. For example, the European Community Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine discusses informed consent.' The
European Community Convention demands that no health care intervention be carried
4
out until a person has given free and informed consent. The details and specifics that
"inform" the person must be appropriate "as to the purpose and nature of the intervention
as well as its consequences and risks."' Although the European Community Convention
lacks explicit reference to alternative medicine, it is often argued that document drafters
considered and rejected a separate treatment of the subject. This reasoning is supported by
the widespread use of alternative medicine throughout European Community member
states.
The duty to inform and obtain consent appears in other international statements as well.
Although these statements do not explicitly reference alternative medicine, they offer some
guidance, as many were developed in light of experimental treatments. Consider that the
6
World Health Organization (WHO) adopts the duty to inform, Principle One of the
7
Nuremberg Code. Although only persuasive in U.S. courts, it requires absolute informed
consent; 8 the World Medical Association adopts the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki, as
1. See, e.g., Laurent B. Frantz, Annotation, Modern Status of Views As to GeneralMeasure of Physician'sDuty
to Inform Patientof Risks ofProposedTreatment, 88 A.L.R. 3d 1008 (1999). This annotation collects representative
modern cases bearing on the status of views as to the general measure of a physician's duty to inform his patient
of the risks of a proposed treatment. It considers only pertinent cases decided in or after 1966; even as to those,
it does not attempt to be exhaustive of such cases, but focuses on those that illustrate the basic dichotomy
between the viewpoints relating to the customary or reasonable disclosure practices of physicians, and the
viewpoints looking to the patient's need for information material to a decision whether to accept or reject the
proposed treatment. Id.
2. Id.Jurisdictions that follow the patient viewpoint standard include Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Departments of New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin for a total of 24. See id.
3. Council of Europe, Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Apr. 4, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 817 (1997)
[hereinafter European Community Convention].
4. Id. at ch. II, art. 5.
5. id.
6. See Joe Collier, The Patient'sRight to Know, 9/11/94 WORLD HEALTH 18, 1994, available in 1994 WL
13650795 (endorsing the principle that before a medicine is proscribed, the patient must be provided reliable
and understandable information about it).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
8. Principle One: The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that the
person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free
power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other
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amended, requiring full consent; 9 and the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical
Research Involving Human Subjects, promulgated by the WHO and the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, recognizes that though informed consent is
important, it alone is insufficient to protect human subjects, particularly such vulnerable
subjects as pregnant women and prisoners. 0
As this issue goes to press, the World Medical Association is reviewing the Helsinki
Declaration, including its requirements for informed consent. The medical community has
expressed concern that proposed changes will weaken the ethical principles underlying
human research."
B.

CANADA

The Canadian view of informed consent is consistent with the current trend in the United
States that requires physicians to engage in more than a discussion about consent. The
standard requires that in addition to describing the nature of the procedure, including its
gravity, any material, special, or unusual risks must be discussed by the physician.'" For
example, in Arndt v. Smith, l4 the Canadian Supreme Court considered informed consent.
A pregnant woman with chicken pox consulted her physician who advised her about some
of the risks, but not about the less common, yet severe, ones. 5 Her child was born with
serious abnormalities related to the unmentioned, although uncommon risks. 16The plaintiff
argued that she might have aborted her child if she had been informed of all the risks."
Though the Court found no causal connection between the physician's failure to inform
and the child's injuries, it reaffirmed the requirements of Reiblv. Hughes,'" an earlier decision
declaring the standard.
C.

FRANCE

As of 1997, France regarded the physician-patient relationship as one of contract. This
is a significant departure from their previous practice. 19 Physicians must now demonstrate

ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an informed and enlightened decision. The
latter requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should
be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which
it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon health or
person that may possibly come from his participation in the experiment.
9. See Kevin M. King, A Proposalfor the Effective InternationalRegulation of Biomedical Research Involving
Human Subjects, 34 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 163, at 175-81 (1993).
10. Id. at 181-84.
11. See Troyen A. Brennan, Proposed Revisions to the Declarationof Helsinki: Will They Weaken the Ethical
Principles UnderlyingHuman Research?, 341(7) NEw ENG. J. MED. 527 (1999).
12. See Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880.
13. See, e.g., Van Mol v. Ashmore, 168 D.L.R. (4th) 637 (1999), available in 1999 D.L.R LEXIS 9.
14. Arndt v. Smith, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 539, 148 D.L.R. (4th) 48.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 66.
17. Id.
18. See Brennan, supra note 11.
19. See, e.g., B. Malavaud, Patient Information:Advancement in Jurisprudence. The Example of Silicone, 8 PRoGRESEN UROLOGIE 188 (1998).
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that they have effectively and validly informed the patient for all types of care, not
just biomedical research.10 Failure to fulfill the contract may result in liability, making the
format of consent more important." The concept of a contractual relationship in health
care is a cutting edge approach that will reduce patient-physician litigation because of the
legal principle that express agreements take precedence over common-law doctrines of
negligence.
D.

ENGLAND

A review of British case law on the issue of informed consent and relevant literature
reveals that Britain's medical professionals are responsible only for disclosing the amount
and type of information that the responsible body of medical opinion would consider right
and proper.22 This reasonable doctor standard significantly differs from the reasonable patient standards found in other countries such as the United States and Australia. At the core
is a difference in attitude regarding the fundamental rights and responsibilities of the patient
and what should take precedence in legal and medical matters. The reasonable doctor
standard also disregards the premise that it is a fundamental right to determine what happens to one's body.
E.

AuSTRALIA

In 1985, Australian courts rejected the British view of informed consent,23 also known as
the Bolam test.24 Instead, they adopted the reasonable patient standard enunciated in the
25
1957 Bolam dissent.
A study of Australian chiropractors found that informed consent for chiropractic care
was usually implied.26 The study revealed that chiropractors seldom obtained formal verbal
consent and never secured written consent. While new patients were informed about the
procedures, potentially serious consequences were seldom discussed. However, the chiropractors studied actively attempted to identify at-risk patients. The study concluded that
chiropractic behavior meets the moral requirements for informed consent but does not
satisfy all legal requirements for such consent."
F.

GERMANY

In Germany, lack of informed consent is an element of a criminal offense.18 Consent

effectiveness depends on whether the patient was informed of all relevant points of treat-

20. See, e.g., B. Lachaux et al., Consent: Between Legality and Legitimacy or Between "Formed"and "Informed"
Consent, 24 ENCEPHALE 503 (1998).

21. See King, supra note 9.
22. See Bolam v. Frierm Hosp. Mount. Comm., [1957] 1 WLR 582.
23. See, e.g., Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hosp. and the Maudsley Hosp., [1984]

QB 493.
24. See M. Kirby, Patient's Rights-Why the Australian Courts Have Reected 'Bolam,' 21 J. MED. ETHICS 5
(1995).
25. See Rogers v. Whitaker, (1992) 175 C.L.R. 479 (discussing the Bolam dissent).
26. See J. R. Jamison, Informed Consent: An Australian Case Study, 21 J. MANIPULATIVE & PHYSIOLOGICAL
THERAPEUTICS 348 (1998).

27. Id.
28. See W. Gropp, Medical Care as Physical Injury From the Viewpoint of the Law andJurisdiction, 92 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR ARZTLICHE FORTBILDUNG UND QUALITATSSICHEUNG 536 (1998).
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ment 5 9 The German legislature has been asked to consider a new definition for unauthorized medical treatment.3 0 A 1997 study from Germany argues that physicians are responsible for "therapeutic enlightenment" as part of informed consent, by giving all information
3
about possible or necessary treatment. '
G. ISRAEL
Israeli Patients' Rights Law explicitly establishes the requirement of informed consent
and divulges the details a doctor must relate to a patient to reach agreement on treatment.32
"In order to receive informed consent, the health care provider will relate to the patient
the medical information reasonably necessary to him in order to enable him to decide
whether to consent to the proposed treatment."" In this context, "medical information"
includes:34 the diagnosis and prognosis of the patient's medical condition; a description of
the essence, procedure, objectives, benefits, and risks of the proposed treatment; the incidental risks associated with the proposed treatment, including side-effects, pain, and discomfort; the advantages and disadvantages of alternative medical treatments; the advantages
and disadvantages of abstaining from proposed alternative therapies; and the innovative
nature of the proposed treatment. The Israeli health care provider must relate the above
information as soon as possible and do so in a manner that enables the patient to have the
greatest possible understanding of the information. Information may be withheld only if
the hospital or institution's ethics committee confirms that disclosure may cause serious
damage to the patient's mental or physical health.
Interpreting the Patients' Rights Law, the Israeli Supreme Court stated that the duty to
inform a patient is judged by recognized criteria of negligence, as applied on a case-by-case
basis." The Court clarified the standard of disclosure as based on the needs of the patient
whose consent is requested or upon what the reasonable patient would require to make an
informed decision.16 The Court recognizes "innovative treatments" and requires a full discussion of the proposed treatment, the alternatives to treatment, and the implications of
no treatment at all." Courts in both Israel and New York38 have referred to recognized
criteria of negligence and rejected a paternalistic approach to the issue of consent with
regard to innovative or unconventional treatments. The Israeli Court adds a duty to fully
discuss not only the proposed treatment, but also alternative treatments.
H.

CONCLUSION

There is an international standard that a patient must be given the opportunity to consent
before treatment, although different countries judge the efficacy of that consent by different

29. See id.

30. See id.
31. See S. Fuchs et al., Physician's ProfessionalResponsibility, Especially the Responsibility for Patient Education,
135 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR ORTHOPADIE UND IHRE GRENZGEBIETE 468 (1997).

32. See Israeli Patients' Rights Law, ch. 4, § 13 (1996).

33. Id. § 13(b).
34. Id.
35. See Z. Weil, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment-the IsraeliExperience, 17 MED. L. 243 (1998) (citing
Shai Berman et al. v. Mor-the Institute for Med. Information, Ltd., C.A. 434/94 (1998)).
36. Id. at 259.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Charell v. Gonzalez, 251 A.D.2d 72 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
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criteria. No one international convention provides a set of guidelines for alternative or
traditional health care providers. Current guidelines are either only for use with experimental treatments, or are limited by geographic applicability or jurisdictional limitations.
Guidelines for experimental treatment can arguably be applied to the use of untested alternative treatments, but this does not alter the conclusion that no standard is adequate.
This inadequacy is important as patients are increasingly physically and electronically
traveling across national borders to obtain treatment otherwise unavailable at home. In
addition, pharmaceutical companies often test new drugs and devices in jurisdictions with
less regulation. Without any international standards for informed consent, vulnerable populations will be at risk when untested treatments are used. There is a lack of efficacy because
existing standards are not sufficiently codified, nor have they been adopted by widely recognized institutions. An international standard and a new model of contract should be
considered the primary goal.

II. Intersexuality
The Constitutional Court of Colombia recently issued two decisions (SU-337/99, May
12, 1999 and T-551/99, Aug. 2, 1999) that significantly restrict the ability of parents and
doctors to perform surgery on children born with atypical genitals. The two specific cases
concerned a two-year-old child and an eight-year-old child. In both cases, the court found
that the consent given by the parents for genital surgery on the child was invalid.
The decisions dramatically limit the ability of doctors in Colombia to perform early
genital surgery on intersexed infants. The court established new rules restricting parents'
authority to authorize genital surgery on their intersexed children, with the goal of forcing
parents to put the child's best interest ahead of their own fears and concerns about sexual
ambiguity. In the past, one ground for this surgery was that it would reduce some parents'
difficulty tolerating their children's sexual difference. The court held that intersexed people
constitute a minority entitled to protection by the state against discrimination. The court
considered parents' authority to consent to medical procedures on behalf of their children,
who are too young to consent for themselves, to depend upon (1) the exigency and urgency
of the procedure; (2) how invasive and risky the procedure is; and (3) the age and degree
of autonomy of the child (for instance, parents may consent to a vaccination for their child,
but they may not force a teenage child to undergo cosmetic surgery).
Surgical modification of intersexed infants has been standard medical practice for some
forty years. Currently, however, there is much controversy as to when and whether early
surgery is helpful or harmful. An alternate model is that surgery should be performed only
when those persons reach an age that they can give their own consent. In Colombia, the
state has an interest in protecting the privacy and autonomy of the family. The state generally assumes that parents will act in the best interests of their children and that parents
are in the best position to determine what is best for their particular child; therefore, the
state should not be allowed to intervene unless there is a clear risk to the child.
In the case of intersexed infants, however, the court found that parents are likely to make
decisions based upon their own fears and concerns rather than what is best for the child,
especially if they are pressed to decide quickly. The court required that legal and medical
communities establish a new category of consent, "qualified, persistent informed consent,"
intended to force parental decisions to take into account only the child's interest. The judges
held that parents may consent to surgery only if they have been given accurate information
about the risks and the existence of alternate treatment paradigms that reject early surgery.
VOL. 34, NO. 2
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Furthermore, the consent must be in written form and must be given on more than one
occasion over an extended period of time, so the parents have time to more fully understand
their child's condition and the ramifications of alternative treatment paradigms.
For children over five, parents cannot consent because the child has achieved an autonomy that must be respected and because the child has already developed a gender identity,
which reduces the urgency of a decision as well as any potential benefits of surgery. In the
case of the two-year-old child, the judges found the parents' consent invalid because it was
not a "qualified and persistent informed consent" (Sentencia T-551/99, Bogota, Aug. 2,
1999). The consent of the parents of the eight-year-old child was likewise invalid because
the child was too old for a surrogate to consent on her behalf (Sentencia SU-3 37/99, Bogota,
May 12, 1999).
The decisions came after exhaustive consultations, more than a year long, in which the
court surveyed experts both within Colombia and abroad on the medical, psychological,
ethical, and legal aspects. The decisions reference a number of opinions by the European
Court on Human Rights and previous opinions of the Constitutional Court of Colombia
on protections for homosexuals and transexuals. Among sources consulted domestically
were the medical faculty of the University of Javeriana, the Colombian Psychological
Society, the Colombian Psychiatric Society, the Colombian Society for Urology, and
Dr. Bernard Ochoa (the surgeon considered Colombia's foremost scientific authority on
intersexuality).
The judges found that the only point upon which proponents and critics of the surgery
seemed to agree is that there are no long-term studies that would substantiate either position. Given the increasingly controversial nature of treatment by early surgery, the court
held the criticism by intersexed people themselves to be of "decisive importance."
The two cases before the court grew out of what might be called Colombia's own
"John/Joan" case. In 1997, media all over the world carried the story of"John/Joan."John
was a boy whose penis was accidentally destroyed during circumcision in the 1960s. Although he was not intersexed, doctors decided the best way to manage a boy without a
penis was to perform a sex change on him. For decades, it was incorrectly reported that the
sex reassignment had been successful, and "John" had grown into a well-adjusted woman,
"Joan." In 1997, the actual outcome of the "John/Joan" case was reported in a medical
journal. Though doctors removed his penis and testes and administered estrogen, John
never developed a female identity. Today he lives once again as a man, is married to a
woman, and has adopted her children from a previous marriage. He has had surgery to
make his genitals look more masculine and to remove the enlarged breasts he developed in
response to the estrogen he was given when doctors were attempting to enhance his appearance as a girl.
In 1995, a young man who had been treated in a similar fashion petitioned the Colombian
Constitutional Court for redress. After his penis was destroyed in a traumatic accident
during infancy, doctors performed a surgical sex reassignment. But like "John/Joan," the
Colombian boy never developed a female gender identity. Ultimately, he argued his case
before the high court and won. In that case, the court held that parents cannot give consent
on a child's behalf to surgeries intended to determine sexual identity (Sentencia T-477/95).
Subsequently, it appears some surgeons specializing in intersexuality recommended surgery
to parents of intersexed children but refused to perform the surgery on the basis of the
1995 decision. The parents of two children then brought suit, requesting that the court
order the surgery.
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Although the high court found that adequate consent had not been given in either case,
surgeons operated on the two-year-old child just three days before the court began to hear
the case. Although surgery had already occurred, the judges felt that the issues raised were
important enough to deliberate on the case regardless.
The Constitutional Court has the final word on constitutional matters in Colombia, so
no appeal is possible. However, the court noted that social attitudes toward intersexed
persons are in flux. The court reserved the option of altering its opinion as social attitudes
progress. Both decisions concluded with a quote from Dr. William Reiner of Johns Hopkins: "All of us must listen to these people, and we must learn not merely to live with them,
but also to learn from them."
The court made a point of sending its decision to medical and public health authorities
including the National Academy of Medicine, the Colombian Urological Society, and the
Ministry of Health. In addition, while the names of the parents and children involved in
the cases will be kept private, the court found it important to enter all of the materials
produced by its year-long investigation into the public record.
It is now the responsibility, the judges noted, of public authorities, the medical community, and ordinary citizens "to open a space to these people, who until now have been
silenced."
Colombia's Constitutional Court went further than merely discussing the question of
early surgery on intersexed children. The court recognized that intersexed persons are a
minority that enjoys the constitutional protection of the state against discrimination, and
every individual has a constitutional right to define his or her own sexual identity.

HI. HPV/AIDS
At the close of the twentieth century, a disease unknown to science just two decades
earlier 9 had claimed the lives of an estimated 16.3 million people: 6.5 million men, 6.2
million women, and 3.6 million children under the age of fifteen.- HTV/AIDS struck every
corner of the globe with devastating fury, killing the estimated 16.3 million people already
mentioned and infecting another estimated 33.6 million people: 17.6 million men, 14.8
million women, and 1.2 million children under the age of fifteen.41 Of these infected persons, 5.6 million were estimated to have been newly infected in 1999: 2.7 million men, 2.3
42
million women, and 570,000 children under the age of fifteen.
43
The numbers are simply staggering. They also confirm that the AIDS crisis is not over, 44
despite advances in antiretroviral therapy that decreased death rates in many industrialized

39. Although the first reports of AIDS appeared in the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report in 1981, one
group of scientists has now traced the origin of AIDS to the 1930s. See Lawrence K. Altman, AIDS Virus
OriginatedAround 1930, Study Says, N.Y. TIMS, Feb. 2, 2000, at A15.
40. See Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the World Health Organization
(WHO), AIDS Epidemic Update, at 3,UNAIDS/99/53E-WHO/CDS/CSR/EDC/99.9-WHO/FCHHSI/
99.6 (1999) [hereinafter UNAIDS/WHO].
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See also Kai Wright, StatisticallyInsignificant GlobalAIDS FiguresDon't Tell the Whole Story, WASH. BLADE,
Jan. 22, 1999, at 1,10.
44. See, e.g., Lawrence K.Altman, More African Women Have AIDS Than Men, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1999,
at A10; Michael Wines, Needle Use Sets Off HI. V.Explosion in Russia, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 24, 1999, at A10.
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countries.4 Those advances produced false beliefs that there is a "cure" for AIDS and that
it is no longer necessary to engage in "safe sex" or other preventive measures.46 The disease
remains fatal, killing more people worldwide than any other infectious disease. 47 Furthermore, even where nations can afford the cost of antiretroviral therapy,48 potential gains in
life expectancy may be lost, as cases have documented the transmission of new viral strains
that are resistant to existing antiretroviral drugs. 49 A person who is H1V-positive may find,
for example, that he or she has become reinfected with a new strain that is resistant to drug
therapy. One study suggested that persons with low levels of HIV in their blood are less
likely to transmit the virus to others, ° but other studies found that transmission is still
possible even after successful therapy because the virus can hide in the brain and in other
parts of the body that are not easily penetrated by the drugs."' Hence, even a perceived
lower risk of transmission does not remove the need for personal vigilance.
HIV remains a highly stigmatized disease in most of the world, 52 and legal protections
are inadequate to remove the stigma or to protect infected persons from acts of discrimination. In India, as in many other countries, the strong association between HIV and promiscuous sex causes some to believe that infected persons "somehow 'deserve' their fate." 3
For example, UNAIDS and WHO reported that women whose husbands contract AIDS
are especially stigmatized in India, even when the women themselves are not infected.A4 Inlaws may throw the women out of their homes and take their children." s These women
have little or no recourse through the Indian legal system.
Legal remedies have worked to protect the rights of persons with HIV in other countries,
however. In Australia, for example, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal ruled
that there was no justification for the Victoria Amateur Football Association to ban an HIV-

45. See Mark E. Wojcik, Recent Developments in InternationalHealth Law, 33 IT'L LAw. 617 (1999); see also
Charles C.J. Carpenter et al.,
Antiretroviral Therapy in Adults: UpdatedRecommendations of the InternationalAIDS
Society-USA Panel,283 JAMA 381 (2000).
46. See, e.g., UNAIDS/WHO, supra note 40, at 4, 10. However, "[wihere antiretroviral therapy is widely
available, it has increased the incentive for people at high risk of HIV [infection] to get tested, since the earlier
they start taking the drugs the better." Id. at 8-9.
47. See, e.g., The Impact of HIV/AIDS on Women, Children, and Development, in 10 HIV/AIDS LEGAL LINK
10 (Sept. 1999) (Australia); see also Catherine Petitnicolas, AIDS Turns South, WORLD PREss REv., Feb. 1999,
at 12.
48. Cf.Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Indust to Drop AIDS DrugLawsuit Against South Africa, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 10,
1999, at A3.
49. See Oren J. Cohen & Anthony S. Fauci, Transmission of Multidrug-Resistant Human Immunodeficiency
Virus-The Wake-Up Call, 339(5) NEw ENG. J. MED.341 (1998).
50. See Study: Low Level-HIVis Less Likely to Spread, CHI. TRI., Jan. 31, 2000, § 1, at 9.
51. See Kathleen Webster, AIDS Studies: HIV Can Still Infect Cells Despite Drugs,CHI. TRIB., May 27, 1999,
§ 1,at 9.
52. In an attempt to remove some of the stigma associated with AIDS in his country, South African High
Court Judge Edwin Cameron announced in April that he had AIDS. See Rex Wockner, High CourtJudge Says
He Has AIDS, Cm. OUTLINES, May 5, 1999, at10. He said that he had done so to ease the plight of other
South Africans with HIV; just five months earlier, a woman was murdered in the township of KwaMashu after
she disclosed that she had HIV. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2000, 482-83 (1999).
53. See, e.g., UNAIDS/WHO, supra note 40, at 12.
54. See id.
55. See id. Additionally, hospitals in India are still reportedly refusing treatment to persons with HTV or
serving their needs poorly, with some hospital staff believing that "treating patients with HJV was a waste of
time and money because the patients would go on to die anyway." Id. See also Celia W. Dugger, Calcutta's
Prostitutes Preach About Condoms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1999, at Al, A8.
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positive athlete and doing so violated section 65(b) of the Equal OpportunityAct.6 Victoria,
however, also uses its general criminal law to aggressively prosecute persons living with
HIV. In 1999, the Victoria County Court sentenced a bisexual doctor to more than four
years imprisonment after pleading guilty to two counts. First, the doctor pled guilty to
failing to tell his wife that he was HIV-positive, which was "recklessly engaging in conduct
which placed a person in danger of serious injury."" Second, the doctor pled guilty to
submitting in February 1994 a fraudulent claim on a disability insurance policy that he had
taken out the previous summer."8 The doctor alleged that he had become infected with
HIV from a needle stick injury at work in December 1993.s9 The court, however, found
that the doctor had falsely declared to the insurance company that he had not engaged in
anal sexual activity since 1980, when he was actually having anal sex regularly with other
men beforeJuly 1993.60
The use of criminal laws to prosecute persons with HIV continues to be criticized as
counterproductive because these laws stigmatize persons with HIV, they are arbitrarily
enforced, they discourage individuals from learning their HIV-status, and they focus, for
example, full responsibility on the person with HIV rather than on the partner who consents
to having unprotected sex. 61 In a surprising criminal law twist in France, however, a former
prime minister and two former cabinet ministers were themselves put on trial on charges
of manslaughter and negligence in a scandal over their decision to allow untested blood
and blood products to be used to treat hemophiliacs.6 The politicians were believed to
have delayed testing the blood products until they could use a French H1V antibody test
rather than an American test.
In the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously that workers with
disabilities should not automatically lose employment discrimination protection under the
Americans with Disabilities Act if they apply for Social Security disability benefits. 63 The
decision was seen as a positive one for persons with HIV.- However, in January 2000, the
U.S. Supreme Court also refused a writ of certiorari on two other cases that were important
to persons with HIV. In one case, the Seventh Circuit ruled that an insurance company
could arbitrarily limit the benefits payable to persons with HlV without violating the Americans with Disabilities Act.65 In the second case, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that prison
officials could segregate prisoners with HIV,even though medical evidence and practices
56. See Chris Ward, Making His Mark: TribunalRules in Favour of HIV Positive Player- When Matthew Hall
Decided to Resume PlayingAussie Rules Last Year He Had No Idea He Would Make Legal History, 10 HIV/AIDS
LEGAL LINK (Australia) 1, 6-7 (June/July 1999).
57. Paul Altmann, HIV PositiveDoctorJailed: Victoria Continues to Prosecute [PersonsLiving With HIV/AIDS],
10 HIV/AIDS LEGAL LINK (Australia) I (Sept. 1999).
58. Seeid.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. For discussion of the introduction of HIV-specific criminal legislation, see, e.g., Liz Parks, Criminalizing

AIDS: Why Are We Responding to HIV with Legislation Instead of Prevention?, A&U:

AmERAcA's AIDS MAGAZINE,

Jan. 1999, at 22.
62. See Ex-LeadersAre Tried in French HIV Case: Blood Supply Tainted in Mid-80s, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 10, 1999,

§ 1, at 10.
63. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys., 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
64. See, e.g., Louis Weisberg, High Court Ruling Favors People with HIV/AIDS, WINDY CITY TIMES, June 3,
1999, at 11.
65. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 845 (2000); but
see also Boots v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 211,215 (D.N.H. 1999).
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in other prisons showed that such segregation was neither necessary nor warranted.- Both
decisions unfortunately upheld policies that arbitrarily discriminate against persons with
H1V The U.S. Supreme Court would have advanced the field of AIDS law by taking these
cases.
IV. Other Recent Developments in International Health
A.

FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION

The Parliament of Senegal has banned the traditional practice of female genital mutilation. Genital mutilation, called female circumcision by many Africans, involves the removal of all or part of the external female genitals to deprive women of sexual feeling.
UNICEF estimates that approximately 130 million women have undergone the procedure.
Several African nations have instituted similar bans.
In the largest trial of its kind in France, an African woman who performed ritual genital
cuttings on forty-eight young girls was sentenced to eight years in prison. The jury also
convicted twenty-seven of the victims' parents. The genital cutting tradition, practiced by
members of France's African immigrant population, was ruled a violation of laws that prohibit the "mutilation" of a minor. Prosecutors described the ritual as a barbaric practice
that attempts to control women by preventing sexual pleasure. Physicians testified that the
practice, which may involve cutting off the clitoris and labia and sometimes sewing the
vagina closed, often causes infections, painful scars, and other health complications.
B. GENETICS
The Parliament of Iceland sold its population's DNA or genetic information to DeCode
Genetics, a biotechnology company. Iceland's geographical isolation, along with a history
of population-devastating diseases, created an ideal DNA source for study. An "opt-out"
system has been developed, whereby citizens have a short amount of time to refuse to donate
a blood sample.
C.

ORGAN DONATIONS

Directly related to Japan's controversial 1997 law that allows for some organ donations
from brain-dead people to occur, the first legal heart and liver transplants were performed
in Japan. The law does not define the absence of brain function as death but, rather, allows
for organ donation by a patient whose brain has stopped functioning as long as the patient
had given prior consent both to donate organs and to be diagnosed as brain-dead.

D.

REPRODUCTION/ABORTION

The Constitutional Court in Germany ordered Bavaria to conform to the rest of the
country and allow abortion clinics. Germany's highest court ruled that the Bavarian law
prohibiting abortion clinics was harmful to women's health because it forced them to travel
to obtain an abortion.

66. Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. deniedsub nom. Davis v. Hopper, 120 S. Ct.
931 (2000).
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The U.K.'s 1967 Abortion Act and its 1990 amendments do not apply to Northern
Ireland. Currently, in Northern Ireland, abortions are only legal when necessary to save
the life of the mother. At Westminster, an all-party parliamentary committee has recommended changing the law in Northern Ireland to conform to the rest of the United
Kingdom.
E.

CLONING

Cloning technology continues to advance rapidly. Scientists from South Korea announced that they used the somatic cell nuclear transfer technique to create an embryo
from an egg and somatic cell of an infertile woman. Scientists report that they stopped the
growth of the four-cell embryo because of the legal and ethical implications of their work.
F.

FORCED OBSTETRICAL INTERVENTIONS

The Court of Appeal in London has issued guidelines about how to handle cases of forced
obstetrical intervention. The guidelines state that competent women who refuse cesarean
sections are not to be forced by hospitals or the courts to undergo the procedure.
G.

RESEARCH

The Medical Research Council of Canada released an official statement tided "Ethical
Conduct for Research Involving Humans," to which all persons seeking research funds from
the Council must comply. The statement lists research conduct that the Council considers
unethical, such as gene alteration of human germ-line cells, the use of ova or sperm obtained
through commercial transactions, the creation of human embryos for research purposes,
and the cloning of human beings.
H.

SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD

The U.K. Department of Health released its "Brazier Report" on surrogacy arrangements. The report recommended that payments to surrogate mothers should only cover
pregnancy expenses, and there should be an upper and lower age limit for surrogate mothers

and a limit on how often a woman can be a surrogate.
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